In recent years, China has been once again trying to emphasise ideological ties with Central and Eastern Europe based on a shared socialist past. In 2012, in order to enhance cooperation with CEE, Beijing inaugurated the 鈥�16+1鈥� initiative, whose membership in the European part is clearly based on CEE countries鈥� previous communist experience. Countries such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland were among the first to give diplomatic recognition to the newly founded PRC. This fact is frequently highlighted in official contacts under the banner of 鈥渢raditional friendship鈥�. To this end, Hungary, as the fourth country in CEE (after Poland, Czech Republic and Serbia), was granted the status of China鈥檚 comprehensive strategic partner in 2017. In the document, the Hungarian side expresses its support for the 鈥済reat rejuvenation of the Chinese nation鈥� advocated by Xi Jinping. This point is also revealing about Prime Minister&苍产蝉辫;翱谤产谩苍鈥檚 increasingly explicit intention to restore 鈥渢he Carpathian Basin鈥�, that is to unite former Hungarian lands lost after the 鈥渦nequal鈥� Treaty of Trianon 1920. For this reason 翱谤产谩苍 has recently that 鈥淸i]n a historical sense, I believe that Hungary鈥檚 one hundred years of solitude is at the end鈥�. From this perspective, both China and Hungary are portraying themselves 鈥� to employ Chinese political vocabulary 鈥� as victims of Western imperialism subjected to one hundred years of humiliation.
In this context, China, having been a semi-colony in the past, still presents itself internationally as a developing country, despite having the second largest economy in the world. However, to date this self-definition is primarily based on political factors rather than the level of economic or developmental advancement. This was explained recently by Xi Jinping at the at the in July. The Chairman of the PRC declared that China will always remain a developing country, no matter how it evolves, firmly supporting the development of developing countries and working towards the creation of close partnerships. The importance of the Global South for Chinese diplomacy was laid out at the in June. Xi explained that 鈥渄eveloping countries are our natural allied force [tongmen jun] in international affairs鈥�. As for , it was defined outright by Chairman Xi in prior to the 鈥�16+1鈥� summit in Suzhou, 2015. The leader of the PRC equated the 鈥�16+1鈥� relations with the level of cooperation between the countries of the Global South, ergo developing.
Accents that might be attributed to the rhetoric of the developing countries vis-脿-vis Chinese counterparts also appeared on several occasions in the pronouncements of the CEE leaders. In line with the Chinese concept of a 鈥渘ew type of international relations鈥�, Viktor 翱谤产谩苍 remarked at the 2016 conference that 鈥淸a]ccording to the conventional Western way of thinking, the West represents a superior ideal and culture. This is laid down in various international doctrines, and the West expects other regions of the world to also embrace these鈥�. A year later in November, during the China-CEE summit in Budapest, 翱谤产谩苍 stated that the 鈥�16+1鈥� platform is a part of China鈥檚 global strategy within the 鈥淏elt and Road鈥�, and as such in international relations, and 鈥渨ill no longer divide the world into teachers and students, but will provide the basis for mutual respect and mutual advantage鈥�. In October of the same year, the president of Serbia and the head of the ruling SNS party Aleksandr Vu膷i膰 spoke in an equally enthusiastic tone in . He declared the Communist Party of China (CPC) as a 鈥渘atural ally鈥� and expressed his will to further strengthen ties and learn from the Chinese example. Similar ideological grounds which bring associations with the South鈥揝outh community were employed by to justify Prague鈥檚 foreign policy U-turn in relation to China.
The changing position of CEE in China鈥檚 foreign policy has been demonstrated in the of the recent . In the light of growing tensions with the US, China has accentuated CEE鈥檚 role in building open and inclusive globalisation. This stands in contrast to the 鈥淏udapest Principles鈥� during his visit in 1995, which 鈥渄id not mention any wish by China to consult the region on international matters鈥�. Thus, it can be assumed that, apart from economic rationale, bilateral partnerships with the CEE countries and 鈥�16+1鈥� are needed by China to build support in the international arena. In this regard, it is significant that South-South cooperation and rhetoric are being echoed; these are based on the Chinese conviction of shared (post)socialist experience and mentality which would translate into better communication and understanding than would be achievable with the West.
This article was originally published by the Asia Dialogue and can be found .